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Parable to Paradigm to Ideology: Thinking through (the Jesuit) 
Theatre
William Daddario
Parable/Paradigm/Ideology
With this essay, I would like to present and analyze a paradigm of thought that 
I refer to as thinking through theatre. This paradigm first appeared to me in Maaike 
Bleeker’s contribution to Laura Cull’s edited collection Deleuze and Performance 
(2009). There, the paradigm provided Bleeker with the opportunity to develop key 
themes in Ivana Müller’s 2004 performance How Heavy Are My Thoughts? through 
the philosophical lens of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s What Is Philosophy? 
(1994). For Bleeker, Müller’s performance constituted an affective articulation of 
Deleuzio-Guattarian concepts and helped to elucidate the theatrical dimension of 
the French philosophers’ dispositif. By the end of her article, Bleeker argues, “How 
Heavy Are My Thoughts? shows thinking in Deleuzian terms as something that 
happens ‘in between’: between people, and between people and the things they 
find themselves confronted with,” while demonstrating that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy constitutes a unique performance in and of itself.1
In what follows, I want to add a peculiar form of dramatic literature to the 
assemblage of performances and ideas created by Bleeker. By inserting the Jesuit 
Giovanni Domenico Ottonelli’s Della Christiana Moderatione Del Theatro Libro 
(Florence, 1652) into that assemblage, I aim to construct a new analytic constellation 
consisting of Bleeker, Deleuze, Guattari, Müller, the seventeenth-century Jesuit 
priest, and, of course, myself.2 The addition of Ottonelli and his treatise opens the 
paradigm of thinking through theatre first surveyed by Bleeker onto a historical 
terrain where the “dramatic” component of the Jesuit’s writing emerged, not 
through a traditional staged performance, but in the spiritual conversion of all who 
had strayed from the Church’s embrace. As a Jesuit, Ottonelli concerned himself 
with helping each and every individual to perceive the path of salvation paved and 
preserved by the Jesuit Order, to practice a disciplined life of self-renunciation, 
and, ultimately, to see the world through the ideological aperture of the Catholic 
Faith enunciated by the Jesuit founder, Ignatius Loyola.
One parable, in particular, from Ottonelli’s treatise reveals his creation as 
a work of dramatic literature: “Si narra la notabile conversione di uno scenico 
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Sacerdote, per mezzo de gli esercitii spirituali di S. Ignatio Patriarca” (“The 
remarkable conversion of a scenic Priest, by means of the spiritual exercises 
of Saint Ignatius the Patriarch”) allegorizes the Jesuit method of conversion by 
introducing a “scenic priest,” who has strayed from his role of shepherd, into a 
sordid life bound up with the recitanti (“actors”) and life-practices of other profane 
stage performers. Perceiving the errors of his ways, the scenic priest embarks upon 
a spiritual quest for rebirth by participating in the Spiritual Exercises, a ritual of 
spiritual contemplation designed by Loyola to turn one’s gaze upon the self and to 
force a symbolic rebirth for those who had strayed from the Church. The “scenic” 
modifier of Ottonelli’s priest contains a backward and a forward glance such that 
it refers both to his participation in the unholy domain of the recitanti and to his 
eventual status as a “virtuous actor” enscened by God within the Jesuit theatre 
of the world. The parable, then, enacts the individual performance of spiritual 
conversion through the character of the priest while it also instructs all who might 
read it to do the same.
By placing Ottonelli’s parable within the critical constellation prepared by 
Bleeker, I intend to illustrate how the Jesuit author sheds his traditional appearance 
as a staunch antitheatricalist and begins to appear as a creator of affects, whose 
goal is a complete rewiring of individual subjectivity through the cultivation of a 
very specific type of acting. Reading Ottonelli alongside Deleuze, Guattari, and 
Bleeker helps to reveal the paradigmatic status of thinking through theatre within the 
Jesuit process of conversion. More than that, such a philosophical-historiographical 
reading suggests the presence of a theatrical ideology, not just within the Jesuit 
Counter-Reformation project but also within our own everyday lives. Thinking 
through the Jesuit theatre, an idea prepared by Ottonelli’s parable when placed 
beside Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, can lead to a self-reflexive analysis of 
the theatres through which we all think, thus forcing a confrontation in the present 
moment with all that conditions our individual processes of subject formation.
With this essay, I hope to provide a useful scaffold for future scholarship that 
applies Deleuzian philosophy to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italian theatre 
and culture. More generally, I intend to add to the growing body of philosophically 
engaged work within performance and theatre studies and to participate in the 
ongoing effort to rethink theatrical paradigms with the help of Deleuze’s concepts. 
After briefly contextualizing Ottonelli and his work within the Jesuit Order of the 
seventeenth-century, I will unpack Bleeker’s analysis of Deleuze and Guattari so 
as to evince from the Jesuit’s work the consequences of thinking through theatre.
Who Was Ottonelli?
We know very little about Ottonelli. He was born c.1584 and died in Florence 
in 1670. Italian scholars and students of Jesuit history paint him in a stark light as 
an antitheatricalist concerned with the morally damning entertainment of theatrical 
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performance in the seventeenth century. The most recent, concentrated survey 
of his life comes from Joseph Connors’s essay, “Chi era Ottonelli?” (“Who was 
Ottonelli?”) in which Connors dresses the Jesuit in his usual garb, so to speak. 
“Ottonelli,” he writes, “does not appear as a theologian or as a writer, nor as ‘the 
mythic Jesuit’ that the theoreticians of art love to imagine, but as a man of action, 
a guerrilla waging war against the theatre, and especially against the role played by 
women.”3 In this light, Ottonelli resembles Stephen Gosson and William Prynne, 
the fiercest critics of the English theatre of the time. “Prynne, like Ottonelli, was 
contrary to all the evils of society: dance, dice [gambling], comedies, lascivious 
pictures, licentious behavior, practical jokes, toasts [with alcohol], long hair, curls, 
country romances, effeminate music, etc., ‘all of which are pagan pastimes.’”4 
Connors goes as far as to make the equation, “Prynne is the English Ottonelli, and 
vice versa.”5
Evidence to support such a claim comes from the anecdotal evidence and 
archival scraps scattered throughout Italian literature and Jesuit historical sources. 
For example, “We spy [Ottonelli] in Catania in 1635, where he interrupted a comedy 
representing an obscene act.” After he moved on from there, “We find him . . . in 
Palermo together with another Jesuit (G.B. Carminta) intent on condemning a poor 
actor to prison for having staged an obscene gesture.”6 While stories like these 
certainly appear to support the title of antitheatricalist, I believe there is another 
picture of the roaming Jesuit worth developing. 
This new image of Ottonelli emerges from the pages of his treatise that 
I introduced above: Della Christiana Moderatione Del Theatro Libro, detto 
L’Ammonitioni A’ Recitanti, Per avvisare agni Christiano a moderarsi da gli eccessi 
nel recitare. The book’s title spelled out its mission; namely, to admonish stage 
actors and to advise each Christian on the necessary means for moderating the 
excesses of theatrical performance. While the content of the book’s admonishments 
and advice follows clearly from that title, its form presents several surprising 
maneuvers that, in the end, reveal the Jesuit’s mission not to be the destruction 
of theatre but, rather, the construction of a new kind of acting. With this work, 
Ottonelli attempted to produce a new subjectivity, one that he called “il virtuoso 
Attore,” or “the virtuous actor.”
The “scenic priest” was the epitome of the virtuous actor. In the parable 
featuring that character, one finds that the ends of acting virtuously are not nearly 
as important as the means or the event of acting:
Quel, che Dio risguarda, e stima in noi altri in questa vita, 
(la qual tutta è, come una Rappresentatione, e Comedia, che 
finisce presto, e piacca à Dio, che non sia Tragedia) non è il 
personaggio, che rappresentiamo, mà come ciascuno, e quando 
si sia portato bene nel rappresentarlo. E questo è l’obligo nostro. 
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“That with which God is concerned and that we should 
be concerned with in this life (that everything is like a 
Representation, a Play, that soon ends, and that it is not a Tragedy, 
thanks to God), is that it is not the character we represent, but 
how we represent it and that we represent it well. This is our 
obligation.”7 
While the subjectivity of the virtuous actor consolidates the totality of a Jesuit 
worldview into a collection of gestures, a specific vocabulary, and a precise mode 
of thinking, Ottonelli’s story focuses on the discipline needed to enact the gestures 
of the virtuous actor, the language required for speaking in accordance with the 
Word of God, and the impetus for spiritual retreat that guides stray sheep into the 
Spiritual Exercises.  As the scenic priest models for his readers, the process of the 
Spiritual Exercises instructs one how to act virtuously and guides the actor into 
the interior of the Church and upon the holy stage where God exists as the sole 
spectator. I argue that, despite the ardent antitheatrical rhetoric of much of Ottonelli’s 
treatise, his parable attempts to help all who encounter it to think through the Jesuit 
theatre of the world. That theatre of the world, or il teatro del mondo, houses the 
converted sheep that the Jesuits manage to refold into the interior of the Church. 
Ottonelli’s strategic adaptation of acting appears plausible when situated 
within the Society of Jesus’s wider Counter-Reformation project, which frequently 
utilized theatre and public performances to effect conversion among the masses.8 
If one removes Ottonelli’s Della Christiana Moderatione Del Theatro from the 
constellation of antitheatrical literature, such as those produced by Gosson and 
Prynne, and places it, instead, beside the Ratio Studiorum or the chronicles of Juan 
Polanco, then the positive uses of theatre within the Jesuit Order begin to rise to the 
surface.9 The Ratio—essentially the blueprint for the Jesuits’ academic programming 
in their schools—for example, explicates the specific uses for Aristotle’s Poetics 
and Rhetoric within Jesuit training programs.10 Polanco’s letters detail subjective 
transformations taking place in individuals who undergo the Spiritual Exercises, 
effectively offering numerous parallels to Ottonelli’s scenic priest.11 When placed 
beside Ottonelli’s tract, these Jesuit writings take on the appearance of scripts that 
prescribe real-life performances and, thus, appear as forms of dramatic literature 
as well as strictly pedagogical or historical documents. 
Of these examples taken from this collection of Jesuit dramatic literature, 
however, I believe that Ottonelli’s work stands out for its potent articulation of the 
steps required to act virtuously in the world. Thus, while the Jesuit Order sometimes 
found Ottonelli’s tactics and treatises a bit extreme (going so far, at times, to dissuade 
him from publishing), I believe the guide to virtuous acting found in Ottonelli’s parable 
of the scenic priest remains faithful to the ideological mechanisms produced by the 
Jesuits in their effort to subjectivize individuals within the Jesuit teatro del mondo.12 
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A careful analysis of Bleeker’s essay and the theatrical act of thinking modeled by 
Deleuze and Guattari will help to make further sense of such ideological mechanisms. 
The Stage of Thought
Bleeker finds the mode of thinking through theatre in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
shift away “from an understanding of thinking focused on thought-content, towards 
a focus on the constellation of elements through which thinking proceeds, and from 
which what is thought emerges in relation to an ‘I’ as the subject of this thought.”13 
Her purpose in acknowledging this shift is to elucidate a relationship between 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “conceptual persona” and Ivana Müller’s 
performance, whereas I intend to utilize her argument to view the emergence and 
instrumental use of theatrical thought in the Jesuit constellation, i.e., their teatro 
del mondo, or the “theatre of the world,” created to house the converted.14 When 
inquiring into the latter, it is not important to ask what one thinks after being 
converted and placed within the Jesuit teatro del mondo; rather, the inquiry must 
uncover the conditions that make possible an “I” that acts as an identity for converted 
individuals to occupy. The “constellation” to which Bleeker refers exists in my 
argument as an assemblage of conceptual frames and affects that order the world 
for whosoever occupies the “I” produced by Ottonelli’s script. 
In Bleeker’s words, Deleuze and Guattari’s act of thinking through theatre 
follows from the recognition of thought as “an event in which a ‘plane’ sets the stage 
for the appearance of a persona, or figure of thought, as the vector of movements 
of thought taking shape through concepts (in the case of philosophy), compositions 
(in the case of art), or knowledge (in the case of science).”15 The function of the 
plane in the case of philosophy is to “acquire a consistency without losing the 
infinite into which thought plunges”; in the case of art, to express chaos through 
percepts and affects that become monuments capable of “confid[ing] to the ear of 
the future the persistent sensations that embody the event”; in the case of science, 
“to provide chaos with reference points.”16 In philosophy, art, and science, chaos 
conditions thought itself and, thus, appears as “a void that is not a nothingness 
but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, 
which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, 
without consequence.”17 
While much of What is Philosophy? theorizes the differences between the 
planes created by philosophy, art, and science, Deleuze and Guattari observe toward 
their conclusion that “there are also cases in which art, science and philosophy 
cannot be understood as distinct [from each other or] in relation to the chaos in 
which the brain plunges.”18 To understand these indistinct relations, Bleeker directs 
her reader to three types of interferences, or zones of overlap, in which the planes 
opened by philosophy, art, and science blur into chaos: “extrinsic interference,” 
which appears when each discipline “remains on its own plane and utilises its 
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own elements,” like when an artist uses an artistic mode of knowledge to grasp a 
philosophical concept; “intrinsic interference,” which appears when, for example, 
concepts leave a plane of immanence (i.e., the plane unique to philosophy) and 
slip into an artistic sensation; and the “No,” which is a nonlocalizable interference 
that is particularly difficult to perceive.19 Bleeker’s point in evoking these three 
interferences is to develop Deleuze and Guattari’s belief that chaos does and must 
exist within every ordered system. Of special interest to my argument is the third 
type of interference, the “No,” which “is to be found where the planes confront 
chaos.”20
Using the plane of composition unique to art’s mode of thinking as a model, 
the “No” can be understood as a type of interference that is “distinct in relation to 
the cerebral plane [i.e., the thinking subject]” but is “no longer distinct in relation to 
the chaos into which the [thinking subject] plunges.”21 It is not merely the case that 
the “No” is linked to the plane of composition, as the plane’s shadow and dialectical 
counterpart; rather, Bleeker points out that art needs its “No.” Art, in other words, 
needs non-art “as that against which [it] come[s] into being.”22 Non-art is the field 
of conditions that makes possible the emergence of art. Encompassing both art 
and non-art, the “No” is a zone of indeterminacy or of uncertainty that always 
accompanies the affects and percepts generated from the plane of composition 
through which individuals express the chaos of the world.
In the final stage of her analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Bleeker 
reminds her reader that the “No” is not the chaos “through which each mode of 
thinking cuts its plane.” In terms of art, philosophy, and science, “[t]his shadow 
is,” rather, “to be found in how that from which they distinguish themselves (as 
‘that which they are not’) relates to this chaos through which they cut their planes.” 
Moreover, “[t]his ‘that which they are not’ [is] already part of making sense of chaos; 
it is the ‘No’ these modes of thinking need at every moment of their becoming.”23 
Bleeker defines this “that which they are not” as theatricality, which calls to mind 
and forces one to contemplate the unseen apparatus that produces the constellation 
through which one thinks the world. 
By defining theatricality as that which thought/art/science is not and as the 
constellation through which one thinks the world, Bleeker opens the door to 
an important spatial dimension within the act of thinking and the act of subject 
formation. With her essay as a lens, theatre becomes the machinery of the outside 
that conditions the inside. Theatre prepares the constellation of concepts and affects 
through which the world coheres (“adsorbs” in Deleuze and Guattari’s words) and 
becomes thinkable, sensible, and knowable. This kind of theatre, she suggests, is 
“constitutive of modern thinking” and operates as a generative chaos that buzzes 
inaudibly as a silent, sonorous interference. This complex conception of theatre is 
important for an understanding of the Jesuit teatro del mondo because it highlights 
the crucial role of uncertainty and nonidentity, or differential ontology, that the 
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Jesuits attempt to remove completely from the subjectivity of the converted.
Thinking through the Jesuit Theatre
I conceive the Jesuit teatro del mondo as a plane of composition produced 
by the Jesuits onto which converted Catholics stepped in order to learn the craft 
of the virtuous actors, so as to be viewed (enscened) and assessed by God and his 
shepherds. This plane of composition rendered intelligible the chaos of the world. It 
did this first by distinguishing itself from the outside world. Once distinguished as 
the teatro del mondo, or the stage to be inhabited by the virtuous actors, the profane 
world, with all its daily tasks, worries, anxieties, and states of affairs transformed 
into a general chaos that opposed the order of the interior of the Church. By entering 
upon the stage, the individual could rid his or her world of chaos, uncertainty, and 
indeterminacy. This, at least, summarizes the argument made by Ottonelli’s parable 
of the scenic priest.
Tuning into the interference of the “No,” however, as theorized by Deleuze 
and Guattari and explicated by Bleeker, helps to deconstruct the claim made by 
Ottonelli and the Jesuits that a life without chaos exists. Could the scenic priest, 
as the allegorical model of the penitent par excellence, ever escape the outside? 
Or did the outside, in fact, inhere within the scenic priest, even after his act of 
self-renunciation, as that which the scenic priest was not, as that from which he 
was always attempting to escape by leading the life of a virtuous actor? Prior to 
conversion, the priest attempted to immerse himself in the world of public theatre: 
commedia dell’arte and Carnevale entertainments organized by the leaders of Italian 
cities for the pleasure and (more frequently) pacification of the common people. 
By attending such affairs, the priest was engaged in a form of thinking through 
theatre, but, according to Ottonelli, the scenic priest was misleading himself. For 
the Jesuit author, the fascination with profane theatrical spectacle constituted the 
source of the foolishness (stoltezze) that distracted the scenic priest and kept him 
from enlightenment. To unfetter himself, the priest embarked upon the Spiritual 
Exercises in an attempt to acquire a true sense of order. The Jesuit theatre of the 
world promised the priest a true character, a subject position from which the chaos 
of the profane world would recede from view. I contend, however, that a crisis of 
the self emerges from that tension between the scenic priest and the “No,” or his 
inhering that-which-he-was-not even as he attempted to expel it. The subjectivity 
of the scenic priest, and, by extension, of all Catholic converts participating in the 
Spiritual Exercises, was founded upon a gap within the self that opened during 
the regimented act of self-renunciation that led him to his public performance of 
repentance in front of the congregation. 
This gap within the convert, however, presents two faces. From Bleeker’s 
point of view, the gap is a necessary and unavoidable condition of consciousness, 
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one that Müller attempts to explore with How Heavy Are My Thoughts? From 
Ottonelli’s point of view, this same gap appears as that which one must fill or pave 
over in order to gain salvation. Bleeker’s perspective and the philosophy of Deleuze 
and Guattari leads down a path that presents the practice of self-fashioning as the 
means for tuning into the interference of the “No” and integrating that frequency 
into one’s sense of the self.24 Ottonelli also advocates a practice of self-fashioning, 
but it is the practice based on Jesuit ideology that substitutes self-renunciation for 
knowledge of the self. From both viewpoints, the question “How am I not myself?” 
plays a dominant role in navigating one’s way through the chaos of the world. For 
Bleeker et al., it is a question prompting a kind of radical self-doubt capable of 
leading an individual to a renewed understanding of his or her self. For Ottonelli 
and the Jesuits, on the other hand, the same question functioned as a moral law 
mandating perpetual self-renunciation.
Once the moral exigency of self-renunciation replaced the quest for knowing 
and caring for the self, the individual negated the generative chaos that always 
existed as that which the individual was not, as the world against which the subject 
defined his or her self. Doing this, I suggest, rendered invisible the structures of 
seeing and knowing the world that shaped the subject’s perceptions and affections. 
The ostensible benefit of the perspective presented by the Jesuit teatro del mondo 
was a removal of chaos from the subject. The Jesuit theatre framed chaos as an 
element of the old self that a subject could eject by undergoing the Jesuit brand 
of the care of the self. From that point on, the Church propped up the individual’s 
subjectivity by creating for each virtuous actor a readymade vocabulary and series 
of gestures intended to articulate a belief in its one true God.
The Jesuits created their own theatre for individuals to think through. It became 
the constellation through which individuals apprehended and cognized the world. 
As opposed to the mode of thinking proposed by Bleeker’s development of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy in which a kind of radical nonidentity is forwarded as the 
marker of modern subjectivity, the Jesuits negated the negative, the chaos of the 
exterior, in the name of order.25 The Jesuit theatre was, in this light, an autonomous 
world that attempted to shut out the complexity of nonidentity with the facility of 
an identity crafted, in large part, through the Spiritual Exercises. 
The crisis of the self, then, was not the knowledge that the self was truly reliant 
on the chaos of the exterior. The crisis did not consist in the individual’s recognition 
that he or she was and was not his or her self. The crisis of the self emerged when 
that knowledge was labeled as an unnecessary component of thought. From the 
Jesuits’ perspective, the teatro del mondo was the sole path capable of slicing 
through the chaos of life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Ottonelli 
averred, the virtuous actor was the only subjectivity capable of accurately making 
sense of that chaos. In the final analysis, however, the virtuous actor contained a 
shadowy underside. “Virtuous actor” stood for a collective identity formed around 
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a “No” that was sublated and replaced with the audibility of Catholic doctrine.
As such, Ottonelli’s tract yields itself to precisely the type of historiographic 
analysis prepared by Michel de Certeau.26 It is an example of what de Certeau 
recognized as the construction of intelligibility through which “shards created 
by the selection of materials, remainders left aside by an explication[,] come 
back, despite everything, on the edges of discourse or in its rifts and crannies.”27 
Ottonelli’s narrative constructs the black and white, before and after, foolish and 
enlightened character of the scenic priest but, in doing so, draws the eye to the 
lingering inherence of the “No” that the Jesuit practice of the self worked so hard 
to deny. Once visible, the “shards” of Ottonelli’s negation of the “No” render the 
ostensibly sensible and ordered Jesuit theatre of the world as nonsensical and 
disordered. It was precisely disorder that the Jesuits inserted into the subjectivity of 
their converted flock by disavowing the generative chaos that Deleuze and Guattari 
theorized. The Jesuit teatro del mondo structured a sense of belonging around an 
invisible outside that the flock would always work so hard to renounce. The Jesuits 
enforced the disorder of the self attained through perpetual self-renunciation as an 
obligatory pleasure in lament. It was a peculiar pleasure taken in not knowing the 
self. The converted subjectivity did not have to know his or her self because the 
Church assumed that labor for the individual.
Ottonelli’s parable of the scenic priest in particular and the entire treatise in 
general acts not only as the script but also as the rehearsal of the performance of 
everyday life mandated by the Jesuits. As a plane of composition, Ottonelli’s stage 
presented a theatre capable of housing each and every individual, a space in which 
each individual could situate his or her self within the subjectivity of the virtuous 
actor. Beyond the language on the page, Ottonelli’s images expressed a summons 
to the Church’s interior through affects and percepts, the means of expression 
belonging to artistic praxis. The folding into spiritual retreat that Ottonelli presented 
with his narrative of the scenic priest should be read as a refolding into the interior 
of the Church, an act which attempted to pacify the chaos of the world but only 
supplanted the possibility of embracing chaos as a necessary “No” within any 
modality of thought. Forgetting or rejecting this knowledge of nonidentity, this 
question of “How am I not myself?” resulted in a crisis of the self. The collective 
subjectivity fashioned for the individual by the Jesuits presented a perspective 
onto the world, but the machinery facilitating that perspective was hidden from 
view and given intelligibility through the language of self-renunciation. Thus, the 
theatre of the world became, simply, the world.
  
The Jesuit Theatrical Subject
The subject position obtained through the Jesuit process of reform presents 
an intriguing extension of theatrical subjectivity in the sense of the word defined 
by Bleeker. She contends that
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Deleuze and Guattari’s account of thinking suggests the 
possibility of conceiving of theatre in terms of thinking, where 
the theatre is not understood as a representation of thoughts, or 
processes of thinking, originating from subjects expressing their 
ideas through theatrical representations, but rather as a practice 
of thinking in which we, as audience, participate.28
Müller’s performance reveals to Bleeker that thinking is a positing of the self, 
but “the ‘I’ that emerges as the subject of our thoughts is not the self that does the 
positing.”29 Turning from an aesthetic-philosophical analysis, such as that made by 
Bleeker, to a philosophical-historiographical critique of Jesuit subject formation, 
I believe that it is possible to locate the emergence of theatrical subjectivity in the 
West within Ottonelli’s treatise. Unlike Müller, who is actively aware of and intent 
on investigating this theatrical subjectivity, Ottonelli’s scenic priest receives his 
theatrical subjectivity as ready made. For the latter, it will always be impossible to 
tune into the generative chaos of the world because that chaos has been removed 
from his sight. 
Faced with Ottonelli’s parable and with the line of critique opened by Bleeker, 
the following question presents itself in the time and space of the now: Through 
what theatres do we think? What are the theatres that structure our thoughts? 
Attempting to answer those questions places the constellation of thought before 
one’s eyes and presents the dual nature of historical inquiry. On the one hand, the 
theatre, dramatic literature, or performance that one thinks about exists as the object 
that one approaches with a specific critical methodology. On the other hand, there 
is always another theatre structuring the historical inquiry from its outset. This 
other theatre, the frame of one’s thought, arises from the constellation of questions 
driving any critical analysis. Both the theatre in one’s study and theatre of one’s 
study must receive visibility; otherwise, the latter dissolves into background noise 
where it channels ideological presuppositions. The potency of Jesuit theatre, with 
its pedagogical and psychagogical power of subject transformation, demands a 
revisitation of the archives containing the traces of its historical endeavors.30 Perhaps 
by attempting to think through the mechanisms of Jesuit theatre we can also gain 
awareness of our own ideological tendencies.
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